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The Prime Sponsor Area
Tucson is the second largest city (next to Phoenix) and the 
only other metropolitan area of any size in Arizona. The 
city, with its 1979 population of 319,300, has the only 
population of more than 6,000 in Pima County. Most of the 
county's 539,800 people live in Tucson and its suburbs, while 
the county spreads over a geographical area larger than the 
State of Connecticut.
A little more than one hour's drive from the Mexican 
border, the county was populated by 118,600 Hispanics, 
15,000 blacks, 12,900 Native Americans, 3,600 Asians, and 
352,600 non-Hispanic whites in 1978. The area's nearness to 
Mexico contributes to a low wage structure which makes 
jobs at the federal minimum wage relatively attractive, even 
though the area's cost of living is above the national average.
Historically, copper mining has been an important source 
of employment, and Pima County is still the home of the 
fourth and fifth largest copper mines in the country. 
However, attractiveness as a retirement community and an 
emerging electronics industry have moved to center place in 
the local economy. Low wages and the human resource base 
of the 30,000-student University of Arizona and the 
22,000-student Pima Community College have been the ma 
jor attractions for the emerging industry. The community 
suffered heavily from the 1974-75 recession but gives prom 
ise of riding through that of 1980 more comfortably.
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Unemployment was at a low of 3.9 percent in the spring of 
1980, rising to 5.8 percent by midsummer.
Staff and Institutional Stability
Contrary to a general CETA reputation for high staff 
turnover, the Tucson prime sponsor has experienced almost 
total stability throughout the entire CETA experience. The 
staff is, of course, small—a total of 35 in 1980—as behooves 
a relatively small prime sponsor in a modest sized city.
That staff has functioned under one director from the 
CETA beginning, and he directed the public employment 
program under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 and 
was director of the Tucson Cooperative Area Manpower 
Planning System under the Manpower Development and 
Training Act prior to CETA. The Tucson Employment and 
Training Administration is divided into five major depart 
ments. Only one department head has ever left the post and 
he only to enter private business, run successfully for the city 
council, and become a strong supporter of his previous col 
leagues from that position.
Top management as well as staff has grown with the ex 
pansion of CETA, and those who came, stayed. Two techni 
cian level positions were lost to the city when a city-county 
consortium split in 1979 but the incumbents continued with 
the county prime sponsor. Thus the record of stability is 
maintained at the technician level. There has been the nor 
mal turnover of clerical personnel.
Only one position experiences troublesome turnover. 
Eleven persons have rotated through the five positions as 
field monitors, or service delivery coordinators in Tucson 
parlance, since the function was established in 1977. The job 
is a difficult one. Approximately 80 percent of the time is 
spent at CETA contractors' facilities observing and checking
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the delivery of service to enrollees. If there is any conflict 
between prime sponsor and contractor, the service delivery 
coordinator is in the middle of it. The service delivery coor 
dinator is also in circulation to observe and be observed, and 
all who have left did so for better jobs. Because the assign 
ment requires judgment and experience, that turnover could 
pose a recruitment and training problem. However, 
replacements are usually hired from the lower ranks of con 
tractor staff with readymade familiarity with the CETA 
world.
At the director level, the explanation of the staff stability 
is political stability. One mayor, now in his third 4-year 
term, has headed city government throughout the CETA ex 
perience. Tucson also has a city manager of similar tenure. 
The CETA staff director reports politically to the first and 
administratively to the second, and has the trust of both. For 
the rest of the staff, the primary explanation is that all have 
been incorporated into the city civil service with full rights 
and protections rather than being grafted on in some tem 
porary fashion as is the more usual CETA experience. In a 
small city like Tucson, city jobs are attractive ones, secure 
and competitively paid and few leave them.
However, the stability of Tucson CETA is not limited to 
the prime sponsor staff. The primary service delivery con 
tractors—the Tucson Skill Center, the Arizona Department 
of Economic Security (DES), Tucson Manpower Develop 
ment, Inc., Operation SER, and Tucson Urban 
League—were all actively involved under the pre-CETA 
Manpower Development and Training Act and Economic 
Opportunity Act. Other minor contractors come and go, 
either providing specialized services or acting as hosts for 
public service employment slots, but these five carry the bulk 
of CETA service delivery responsibility year after year.
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Contractor staff are almost as turnover-free as prime 
sponsor staff. The skill center went through a double transi 
tion at the end of MDTA as the director left to head a private 
trade school. The deputy became director but was not com 
fortable with the annual competitive funding process of 
CETA. The head of the DES/CETA unit, who had served 
the National Alliance of Businessmen-Job Opportunities in 
the Business Sector (NAB-JOBS) program from within DES, 
took over the skill center directorship in 1977 and has re 
mained since.
The DES/CETA unit is staffed by professional employ 
ment service staff, primarily of Mexican-American extrac 
tion, and has experienced only that one change of leadership. 
SER, the Urban League, and Tucson Manpower Develop 
ment all continue to function under their pre-CETA leader 
ship. Turnover below the director level has been moderate 
for all. Only the prime sponsor and DES enjoy the protec 
tion of tenured systems. But salaries of all are competitive 
within the employment and training fraternity and with the 
private sector in a relatively low wage labor market.
Personal relationships are good except with the SER direc 
tor, who is the "stormy petrel" of Tucson CETA. Militant, 
aggressive, and competent, he is a constant battler for more 
funds to provide adult basic education and English as a sec 
ond language programs for his Hispanic constituency. 
Private sector members of the planning and private industry 
councils find his conduct in meetings disruptive and ir 
ritating. But all of that is offset by SER's outstanding per 
formance. Thus Tucson CETA tends, in cliche, to be a 
reasonably happy and relatively close family.
Prime Sponsor/Federal Relations
"Adversary" is a better description of relations between 
the Tucson prime sponsor and the Labor Department's San
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Francisco regional office. For the Tucson staff, that rela 
tionship is personalized by the federal representative or "fed 
rep" assigned full time to the Tucson consortium and now to 
both the city and county prime sponsors. The position is 
characterized by high turnover, both because the fed reps do 
not stay on the job long and because there is deliberate rota 
tion. Of the eight fed reps who have served Tucson, only the 
current (mid-1980) one has ever had experience as a member 
of a prime sponsor staff. The Tucson staff, until that recent 
change, have viewed the fed reps as uniformly incompetent 
and uncooperative, inexperienced, and unwilling to invest 
the time to learn the Tucson scene and the reasons for and 
nature of its policies and practices. Knowing no way to be 
helpful, the Tucson staff feel, the fed reps can only be nit 
picking enforcers.
Compounding the problem of local-regional relations is 
the national system, devised by the Congress and the U.S. 
Department of Labor, which requires the prime sponsor 
each year to complete planning for the next without knowing 
what level of funding will actually be available and to adjust 
to frequent funding and policy changes within each program 
year. Then too, the Tucson director has excellent 
Washington contacts and invariably knows of national of 
fice decisions weeks before they are communicated to the 
regional office and more time passes before the regional of 
fice can translate and transmit them through field directives. 
Confidence in the regional office is not helped by situations 
in which that office is accusing the prime sponsor of non- 
compliance for advance response to a coming national direc 
tive.
On the other side of the coin, many of the regional staff 
consider Tucson staff obdurate and uncooperative. Admit 
ting all of the shortcomings of their position, they point out 
that relations are good with other prime sponsors in the 
region, despite the same set of obstacles.
370
At the time of this writing, however, the whole CETA ad 
ministration in the regional office has been restructured and 
restaffed. A new federal representative has been assigned 
who has several years of prime sponsor level experience 
behind him. He has spent extensive time in Tucson to learn 
local conditions and practices and has been helpful in break 
ing loose some longstanding requests for information. Both 
sides are hopeful that a new and more positive relationship 
may emerge.
Political Vulnerability
The Tucson experience is an instructive example of the 
vulnerability of the CETA system to erratic forces of local 
politics. Tucson CETA functioned for five years as a consor 
tium consisting of Tucson city, Pima County, and the city of 
South Tucson.
At CETA's advent only the city or the county including 
the city had the 100,000 population required for prime spon 
sorship. The county, at the time, lacked the administrative 
structure to handle such an enterprise. A consortium was 
formed including the city of South Tucson—a mile square 
enclave of 6,000 population, three-fourths of them Mexican- 
American, totally surrounded by the city of Tucson.
Tucson city assumed lead position in the consortium and 
the CETA staff all became city employees. A liaison commit 
tee of one member each from the Tucson city council, the 
five county supervisors, and the mayor of South Tucson 
were the chief policymaking body reporting back to their 
larger groups. Administratively, however, the staff director 
reported to the Tucson city manager. The prime sponsor ad 
visory council was dominated by contractors who could not 
vote on issues of pecuniary interest to them, but meetings 
were long and acrimonious and tainted by self-interest. 
Despite that flaw, the system ran well except for continuous
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complaints from Hispanics and Native Americans about 
their share of the resources.
The county outside the city limits grew to prime sponsor 
eligibility. However, Tucson still so dominated the county's 
population that four of the five county supervisors were 
elected by a totally Tucson constituency and the fifth 
represented the rest of the county along with some Tucson 
voters. The latter, a university professor, came to resent the 
city's dominance in CETA affairs and agitated for exercise 
of the county's right to separate prime sponsorship. The city 
CETA staff charge that the federal regional office staff en 
couraged those ambitions, but the latter deny it. At any rate, 
Pima County filed in 1979 for independent prime sponsor 
ship, which became official October 1, 1979, for the 
1980 fiscal year. South Tucson could only go along with the 
county.
The split brought no evident gain for the CETA-eligible 
citizens of either the county or the city or for employers or 
for the labor market. The city staff continued intact except 
for the loss of two positions. A new county staff had to be 
developed and the aggregate administrative cost rose. Except 
for one private not-for-profit organization providing rural 
services, the same set of contractors serve both prime spon 
sors and both populations. Two sets of requests for pro 
posals go out each spring and each contractor makes two 
responses and keeps two sets of books and reports. The two 
sets of enrollees remain mixed in the receipt of services. The 
consortium bonus of $260,000 per year (a little less than 2 
percent of the new-CETA funding authorized for fiscal 
1979) was lost to both prime sponsors. A prime sponsor 
which had planned for an entire labor market and more was 
replaced by two, each operating over a fragment of both the 
demand and supply sides of the local labor market.
The only observable gain was reform of the advisory coun 
cil structure for the city prime sponsor.
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The Decisionmaking Process
The city had become eligible during the 1974-75 recession 
for aid under the Economic Development Act and an 
employer-dominated committee had been appointed to 
prepare the Overall Economic Development Plan (OEDP). 
That committee had worked well and the CETA staff direc 
tor and the director of the Urban League were already 
members of it. At the CETA director's advice, the mayor 
assigned CETA responsibilities to the same committee, add 
ing the representatives required by CETA law and regula 
tion.
The OEDP/CETA advisory council has worked ex 
ceedingly well during its first year, despite the OEDP group's 
amazement at the CETA workload. A long range planning 
committee and a plant siting committee carry on the major 
OEDP responsibilities. There is a CETA planning committee 
with task forces for Title II-B programs, youth programs, 
and public service employment programs. The CETA com 
mittee actively participates in setting the boundaries for the 
annual request for proposals and the task forces read, assess, 
and rank all of the proposals and join with the staff in 
recommendations to the full OEDP/CETA council.
The council chairman is vice president for economic 
development of a major bank and the membership is heavily 
weighted by business interests. The private industry council 
(PIC) chairman, another banker, is a council member, as are 
all but one of the PIC members. Council membership is for 
bidden to any person whose salary is paid from CETA 
funds, thus eliminating from membership all contractors ex 
cept the employment service, the skill center director whose 
salary is paid by the community college, and the Urban 
League director who is paid from United Way contributions. 
A nonvoting subcommittee of Community Based Organiza-
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tions (CBOs) exists to give a voice to the contractors and 
other interested parties.
The council chairman requires advance written request for 
all agenda items and will not allow any meeting to last more 
than two hours. Appearances before the full council are by 
invitation only but interested parties can be heard at the task 
force and committee levels at their own request. Not only the 
chairman but other private sector members have let it be 
known that they will continue to serve and devote the 
necessary time only if the meetings are brief and businesslike 
and if their advice is taken seriously.
The first year of the new arrangement was promising. 
Several training sessions were held to acquaint the council 
members with CETA history, goals, and procedures. The 
members turned out to be strong allies of the staff in favor 
ing objective criteria and rejecting political judgments. The 
mayor and council overturned only one joint council-staff 
recommendation. They funded a Native American contrac 
tor whose weak administrative abilities and fiscal controls 
produced chaos. Economic development and labor market 
policy decisions are admirably linked. Whether the private 
parties will continue to devote the needed time and energy re 
mains to be seen.
Orchestrated Decentralization
At first look, the Tucson decisionmaking process appears 
to be so decentralized as to prohibit any meaningful plan 
ning. The staff, along with the CETA planning committee of 
the OEDP/CETA advisory council, decide what mix of age, 
race, and sex characteristics is appropriate for the next fiscal 
year's enrollees. They make their best guess of the amount of 
funds likely to be available under various CETA titles. They 
then send out a request for proposals containing only those 
two pieces of information. With no further guidance except
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past experience, contractors then propose what groups and 
how many they hope to serve, what mix of services they pro 
pose, and the price tag. Each contractor is expected to be 
responsible for intake, all service delivery, whether directly 
or by subcontract, job development, and placement. Pro 
posers are provided with the limited amount of labor market 
data available from Department of Economic Security 
sources but essentially contractors are left to their own 
devices to judge what the labor market needs or will absorb.
Confronted with the charge that the procedure delegates 
or abrogates to the contractors the essential planning deci 
sions, the director counters, "Not so." He would prefer a 
centralized intake system, but is convinced that the political 
strength of the race and ethnic groups and their community 
based organizations and the responsiveness of the politicians 
preclude it. Advance allocation of the available funds among 
the alternative service components would tie the hands of the 
decisionmakers, he argues. Suppose most of the proposals in 
one service area such as classroom training are mediocre 
while all of those on-the-job training are outstanding. It 
would be necessary to fund the mediocre proposals up to the 
limits of the allocations for classroom training and reject the 
outstanding ones beyond the OJT limit. Under present pro 
cedures, staff and council select the best from an open 
"smorgasbord" of proposals and assemble a community 
employment and training program from among a concrete 
set of proposals rather than supposition and expectation.
But where is the impact of employer need and labor 
market information? The contractors know the needs of 
their constituent groups better than anyone else can, is the 
argument, while response to the demand side is kept flexible 
by the role of the skill center. A high proportion of the eligi 
ble enrollees need remedial education, language preparation, 
and job search training—all determined by the labor supply. 
Most training occurs in the skill center which contracts to
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deliver training unbounded by predetermined occupational 
clusters. If changing demand is signaled, by either employer 
contacts or placement rates, enrollments are simply shifted 
from less- to more-demanded occupations. In reality, of 
course, the CETA training occupations in Tucson, as 
elsewhere, tend to be in a set of high turnover, continuous 
demand entry level occupations which rarely change 
significantly. Therefore, the key decisions in Tucson are seen 
to be the relative competence of the contractor and the 
choice between occupational and nonoccupational pre 
requisites of employability. These choices can be made from 
the proposed smorgasbord.
The Primacy of Training
Training, in the broad sense of employability develop 
ment, is clearly the preferred choice of the prime sponsor, 
most contractors, and most eligible applicants whenever 
discretion is given and perceived. CETA Title VI offers no 
choice but public service employment. Title II-D funds could 
legally be used for training, but they are designated as public 
service employment (PSE) and the possibilities for realloca- 
tion are viewed as a legal technicality rather than a practical 
possibility. Depending as it does upon contractor initiatives 
to change the mix of services, the Tucson prime sponsor has 
been slow to take advantage of the invitation—and now the 
directive—to add and enlarge a training component to ac 
company Title II-D PSE. However, it has declared an inten 
tion to move more strongly in that direction in 1981.
Work experience is considered appropriate for youth and 
maintenance of effort regulations added by the Youth 
Employment Demonstration Projects Act keep a substantial 
amount of Title II-B funds allocated to youth programs and, 
therefore, in part to work experience.
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Beyond that, however, Title II-B funds, over which the 
prime sponsor has greatest discretion, are spent entirely on 
various forms of employability development with emphasis 
on occupational skill training (Tables 1 and 2 provide the 
mix of expenditures and enrollments for 1979). Under the 
Tucson smorgasbord approach, the training priority is exer 
cised in the selection of contractors. And since each contrac 
tor performs its own intake, contractor selection to a 
substantial degree determines who is to be served as well as 
what services are to be provided.






































Table 2. CETA Enrollments under Programs Funded by the Tucson, Pima 
























SER serves a substantially Hispanic population and em 
phasizes English as a second language (ESL) and adult basic 
education (ABE). Its program is a well articulated and highly 
effective one in which those who are monolingual in Spanish 
undergo six months to one year of ESL instruction, are 
taught job search and survival techniques at the same time, 
and are then placed by SER's job development staff. To add 
skill training to such extensive language training is con 
sidered to be an excessive investment in some individuals at 
the expense of others when SER applicants already wait two 
to four months.
For those with limited English speaking ability (LESA), 
SER conducts a program offering a few weeks to a few 
months of English language instruction followed by referral 
to the skill center for occupational skill training or to on-the- 
job training. For those verbally functional in English but of 
limited literacy, there is a three-level ABE program. The am 
bitious goal which has been accomplished by the average 
enrollee is to achieve three years of basic education advance 
ment for each six months of enrollment, the most advanced 
level leading to a General Educational Development (GED) 
certificate. The ABE program does not lead into the skill 
center but into on-the-job training or direct placement.
The services of the Tucson Urban League are available to 
all, but they are used by a primarily black population. After 
intake, the Urban League specializes in on-the-job training, 
job search training, and referral to the skill center for oc 
cupational training. On-the-job training has been the special 
ty of the national Urban League, and the Tucson chapter has 
followed that lead. Substantial numbers of Tucson 
employers are susceptible to affirmative action pressure, and 
the Urban League uses these pressures as leverage for on-the- 
job training placements.
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In addition, the Tucson Urban League staff were in 
structed by their national and regional leaders in the arts of 
job search training as that activity came into vogue across 
the country. The Tucson Urban League therefore initiated a 
pre-job training program through which, in a 2-week for 
mat, those considered job ready are taught how to search for 
their own jobs. Aided also by the job developers, enrollees in 
this 2-week sequence have maintained placement rates well 
above 80 percent.
Finally, Urban League, like SER, maintains responsibility 
for 31 slots at the Tucson Skill Center. All league applicants 
considered appropriate for skill training are first sent to the 
skill center for vocational assessment. Though the skill 
center must accept for skill training whoever the Urban 
League (or any other contractor) refers to slots controlled by 
the contractor, the assessment helps determine who should 
receive what service. Those referred by Urban League to its 
skill center slots continue to receive stipends from the con 
tractor and return for job development and placement at the 
completion of training. (That is also true for the other major 
contractors.) Tucson Urban League has also referred a few 
of its applicants to private clerical and trade schools, paid 
tuition for their enrollment, but has not found them effective 
because of their lack of supportive services.
The CETA unit of the Department of Economic Security 
belies any implication that the employment service cannot or 
will not serve the disadvantaged. Staff members pulled out 
of their regular DES activities appear to do as well in serving 
the total poverty population as the community based 
organizations do for their racially and ethnically concen 
trated poor. DES/CETA performs a broadly based intake 
role from a central city multipurpose center and outlying 
employment service offices. After counseling by one of the 
counselors assigned to the unit, clients are referred directly
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to jobs or to on-the-job training, classroom training, or pre- 
job training, prior to job development and placement.
DES/CETA maintains 13 OJT slots with cooperating 
employers. It maintains an additional 35 slots at the skill 
center. Many of the numerous applicants it cannot serve in 
either of these ways are put through its pre-job training pro 
gram, similar to the Urban League approach but somewhat 
higher in volume, with approximately 15 entering each two 
weeks. The mixes of age, race, sex, education, public of 
fender status, and handicap give no evidence of pre 
selection. A lone staff member puts them through an inten 
sive week of motivation, self analysis, resume writing, video 
taped simulated interviews, and telephone practice. They 
then decide upon an occupation to pursue and draw from the 
telephone yellow pages and other sources a list of employers 
likely to hire in that occupation. Goaded and cajoled by the 
instructor, they then spend the second week on the telephone 
eight hours a day seeking interviews or out being interviewed 
until a job is found. The placement rate is above 90 percent. 
The retention rate, as in all Tucson CETA programs is essen 
tially unknown.
The skill center is the primary source of occupational skill 
training in Tucson. A few applicants have been individually 
referred by contractors to a private clerical college and a 
trade school. The trade school had a direct CETA contract. 
The training in these two institutions is of high quality, but 
trainees can survive it only if they have the same attributes as 
the general student bodies. The prime sponsor and the con 
tractors prefer to allocate the training dollars to an institu 
tion designed to serve the disadvantaged.
The Tucson Skill Center is such an institution. It began 
under MDTA within the jurisdiction of the vocational 
education department of the public schools but made a suc 
cessful transition to CETA and administration as a unit of
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the Pima Community College. It conducts an extensive voca 
tional assessment program using an extraordinarily broad 
range of assessment tools. In fact, many schools and other 
institutions in the area refer their enrollees and applicants for 
assessment on a fee basis. It employs a sympathetic counsel 
ing staff, maintains a nurse on site and a doctor on call, has 
some supervised residential facilities, maintains two vans to 
bring students in from rural areas and Indian resevations, 
keeps its curriculum bilingual in Spanish and English, and 
offers basic education supplementations.
Current occupational offerings at the skill center are: auto 
body, automotive repair, basic financial skills (teller, 
cashier, etc.), building maintenance, business and office, 
electrical helper, electromechanical assembly, food service, 
and health occupations (licensed practical nurse and nurses 
aide). However, the skill center obligates a blanket number 
of slots to CETA without limiting them by occupational 
area. Intake is left to the other contractors acting as referral 
agencies. The vocational assessment unit recommends an ap 
propriate assignment for each referral. However, that is not 
binding on the referring agency or the applicant. The skill 
center must accept whoever is referred except that licensing 
requirements make it necessary to impose a high school 
graduation or equivalent minimum for the nursing program. 
If some occupational clusters grow as others shrink in 
response to the referral process, the skill center must meet 
the administrative challenge.
Despite administrative attachment to the community col 
lege system, skill center staff have none of its job security, 
few of its fringe benefits, and a lesser level of pay. On the 
other hand, they are not required to have the same set of 
credentials, though many do. Most instructors have substan 
tial trade experience, receive less pay than they had been ac 
customed to, but have more job security and more pleasant
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surroundings. Above all, they enjoy the challenge of 
teaching and the sense of community service.
The skill center has a well developed philosophy of educa 
tion based on the enrollee as an adult self-directed learner 
and the instructor as a resource person. It follows practices 
of open entry (enter any time from any background), open 
exit (leave whenever job ready), and individualized modular 
instruction. It trains in broad occupational clusters from 
which placement is possible into a range of jobs. It maintains 
a remedial learning center to which trainees are referred by 
their skill instructors according to need. It designs its own 
curricula as well as drawing upon those obtained from other 
sources. It is gradually using its community college affilia 
tion as leverage, so that its enrollees are now eligible for 
federal Basic Education Opportunity Grants and it is begin 
ning to give community college credit in some courses.
The skill center has worked closely with new or expanding 
employers in coupled classroom-OJT programs. Most 
recently in electronic assembly, the trainees receive short 
periods (typically two weeks) of pre-entry instruction from 
the skill center before entering an OJT phase of CETA sub 
sidized employment.
The skill center maintains a completion rate above 85 per 
cent. It is not responsible for job development and place 
ment. The enrollees return to the referring contractors for 
that. For 1979, placement rates were 74 percent placement 
rate for SER enrollees, 67 percent for Urban League, and 86 
percent for DES/CETA. However, data are not available to 
break tfut skill center completers from those overall place 
ment rates.
The only black mark on the skill center escutcheon is its 
facility. An abandoned department store in a declining part 
of town, its oft-remodeled innards resemble catacombs and 
its plumbing and air conditioning facilities (a must in the
382
Tucson climate) are in frequent disrepair. For overflow it 
rents other buildings which are even worse. However, help is 
on the way. As another by-product of the fortuitous 
OEDP/CETA partnership, an industrial park developer 
member of the committee has offered to provide new space 
at submarket rates which will be designed specifically for 
skill center needs. Given the high maintenance costs of the 
present facility, the actual cost will not be much higher. If 
the Tucson skill center can maintain the current attitudes of 
dedication within the new setting, it will be a most admirable 
institution.
Overall, Tucson intake agencies report that 85 percent of 
CETA applicants request skill training. But skill training 
costs over $7,000 per trainee, including stipends, whereas 
OJT costs average less than $1,000 per enrollee and job 
search training costs about $150 per person. Table 3 provides 
a comparative breakdown of Title II expenditures between 
training and other services. The preference for classroom 
training is demonstrated by the fact that nearly all funds 
available for that purpose are spent, whereas there is less 
pressure to spend OJT and supportive services funds. The 
other services exist because the prime sponsor attempts to 
maintain a balance among alternative services. Waiting 
periods for CETA enrollments range from two to four 
months for all contractors. But within budget limitations, 
classroom skill training is nearly everyone's favorite.
The Tucson training system is still essentially what was put 
in place under the Manpower Development and Training 
Act. It has proven its adaptability as well as its durability. 
The decentralized nature of the system enables it to expand 
and contract without breaking. There is no large investment 
in buildings and equipment. No permanent commitments are 
made to instructors who seem to be readily available. Ex 
panding means renting space and adding instructors. Con 
tracting requires the opposite. The Tucson CETA training
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system appears to be capable of operating in a range of 75 
percent to 125 percent of current enrollments with no undue 
strain.
Table 3. Title II-B Authorizations and Outlays, Tucson, Pima County, 



























Need for Specialized Institutions
One of the lessons of the Tucson experience is the need for 
institutions that specialize in the serving of various popula 
tions. The Tucson Skill Center, SER, the Tucson Urban 
League, DES/CETA, and Tucson Manpower Development 
(not described here because of its youth concentration) sur 
vived their MDTA origins because they continued to meet a 
need. All serve a racial and ethnic mix, but their enrollees ap 
pear to have a preference for those that carry their own iden 
tity. That specialization is crucial when language and sharp 
cultural differentiation is involved. Thus SER specializes in 
bringing Hispanics to the point where they can compete in 
the skill center and the job market. The Papago Indian tribe 
meets most of CETA's reservation Indian responsibilities, as 
does a rural contractor for the Yaquis. Lacking a competent 
urban Indian contractor, members of those tribes living in 
the Tucson metropolitan area (and some of the reservation 
dwellers) are served by the skill center and other contractors 
but not without considerable dissatisfaction.
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But despite the need for racial and ethnic specialization, 
there are plenty of CETA eligible non-Hispanic whites as 
well as the less culturally different of other races who can be 
served effectively by a sympathetically specialized unit 
within the employment service. DES/CETA has the advan 
tage of direct linkage to major labor market and social 
welfare institutions. But without the specialized assignment 
to serve the CETA eligible, it is doubtful that they would 
seek and receive the same level of service from the 
mainstream Job Service offices.
As training institutions, the community college and the 
private proprietary schools can serve those few CETA 
eligibles who possess all of the characteristics of their regular 
student bodies except for family income. However, if there 
were not a skill center in Tucson, someone would have to in 
vent it. There are too many of culturally different and com 
petitively disadvantaged backgrounds who could neither sur 
vive in training institutions nor succeed in the labor market 
without specialized help.
Is CETA Worthwhile?
Hardly anybody in Tucson would categorize CETA as a 
four-letter word. Judging from employers who serve on the 
advisory and private industry councils and participate in 
OJT programs, the business community welcomes its help. 
Organized labor is not strong in Tucson but has been suppor 
tive of CETA to the extent of cooperating in specialized pro 
grams not described here for lack of space. The racial and 
ethnic communities want only more. The political support is 
bipartisan. To the extent they are aware of the situation, all 
would respond to the federal government, "Leave your 
money and go away and don't bother us. We need your 
resources, but, in administration and planning, you are only 
in the way." One can hope that attitude is subject to change.
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CETA's administrators and decisionmakers have well ar 
ticulated policies. To an outside observer, it would appear 
that a centralized intake and assessment process would be 
more likely to get each applicant the most compatible assign 
ment to services. The actors on the scene have concluded that 
the political price would be too high.
The labor economist sees the need for a greater labor 
market information input into planning, including projec 
tions of the future level and structure of employment by oc 
cupation and industry. The administrators argue that a flexi 
ble training institution responding to employer and enrollee 
demand and placement rates is more dependable. The truth 
in between is that the occupations trained for are those 
characterized by high turnover and always in demand or 
undergoing secular expansion such as the local electronics in 
dustry.
But do the enrollees complete training and get jobs? The 
administrator responds with impressive placement rates. But 
are those jobs which would not have been obtained without 
program participation, do they last, and are the benefits 
worth the cost? The administrator cannot answer except to 
protest that followup is too expensive, taking scarce money 
better spent on direct participant services, that control 
groups are impractical, and that only limited analysis is 
possible without a computerized management information 
system. The observer/analyst responds, "I know in my heart 
you are doing good but I can't prove it."
